Costs

The costs of the Apollo missions, and space exploration in general, were more than just financial. Monetary values can never be put on the lives of individuals lost. The Apollo 1 accident and its follow-up investigation resulted in substantial changes in the programme with resultant impacts on cost and schedules. The principal schedule changes and the cost impact of the accident on the programme follow.

The initial Apollo manned flight with the modified Block II spacecraft is scheduled for launch by an uprated Saturn I vehicle during the third or fourth quarter of calendar 1968, some 17 or 18 months after the scheduled launch of Apollo 204 in February 1967. The first unmanned qualification flight of the Saturn V launch vehicle carrying a Block I spacecraft was rescheduled from early 1967 to late 1967 when a highly successful system performance was realized. This flight is to be followed by a third Saturn V unmanned flight in 1968. If the Saturn V launch vehicle is manrated as a result of these flights and the first manned Block II spacecraft mission meets its objectives, subsequent Apollo flights involving command module and lunar module operations in earth orbit in preparation for the lunar landing would be transferred to the Saturn V vehicle rather than utilizing dual uprated Saturn I launches for these practice missions as previously contemplated. However, dual uprated Saturn I missions could be flown as backup missions in the event of Saturn V vehicle qualification delays. A Saturn V vehicle success schedule now projects six manned launches in 1968 and 1969 with the possibility of accomplishing a lunar landing before 1970.

Time is a major factor influencing the cost of the Apollo programme. In 1966 NASA advised the committee that the total estimated cost of the Apollo program was $22.718 billion assuming that all 12 uprated Saturn I and 15 Saturn V launch vehicles were required for the lunar landing. The comparable estimate provided by NASA during the May 9, 1967 hearing is $23.190 billion, an increase of $472 million. The increase is largely due to the effect of stretching out the Apollo/Saturn V launch schedule. However, early achievement of the lunar landing objective would permit the allocation of unused Apollo hardware and an appropriate share of operational expenses to the Apollo applications program with an offsetting reduction in the cost of the Apollo program.

There was no immediate impact of the accident on the NASA fiscal year 1967 financial plan or the fiscal year 1968 budget request because of offsetting factors such as the suspension of flight schedules and changes in spacecraft production planning, which permitted adjustments within the total NASA budget framework for these years. The overall impact of the Apollo 204 accident, therefore, will appear in future years as is evidenced by the increase in the total runout cost estimate for the Apollo program (Source:NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA. Headquarters, Washington, DC)

While 1969-71 were the harvest years - four missions that put men on the moon, and the safe return of Apollo 13 after its breakdown in space - they were not so kind to Kennedy Space Center and the men who worked there. Congress cut the NASA budget, NASA cancelled Apollo missions, KSC and its contractors laid off thousands of employees - not in one fell swoop but in a succession of smaller blows. Space enthusiasts had hoped to go on to a manned landing on Mars in the mid-1980s; it was not to be. American public opinion was shifting its priorities to other matters: civil disorders, Vietnam, decaying cities, campus unrest, and inflation. And Apollo was a victim of its own success. For laymen, one moon landing after another was a little boring. Noting the public's limited interest in Apollo 12, the New York Times concluded that a collective sense of anticlimax was "perhaps predictable considering the intense national emotion spent on the first moon landing four months ago." (Source)

Probably the biggest reason for Apollo's decline was the detente in American-Soviet relations. In 1961, amid cold war animosities, the United States was trailing the Soviet Union in the world's most widely publicized form of competition, manned spaceflight. Eight years later, the United States had clearly demonstrated its superiority. Despite the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, relations between the two nations had improved. Americans seemed less eager to spend "whatever it took" to surpass the Russians in space. Agreement on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. rendezvous mission (the Apollo-Soyuz flight of 1975), signed before the end of the Apollo program, clearly indicated a new policy of cooperation in space.

NASA budgets marked the contour intervals of Apollo's descent. Appropriations had exceeded $5 billion in the mid-1960s; in fiscal years 1969 and 1970 they fell below $4 billion. Apollo research and development funding declined from $2.9 billion in FY 1967 to $2 billion in FY 1969. Initially, NASA's follow-on programs to Apollo-Skylab, an earth orbital laboratory; Voyager, an unmanned Mars mission; and Nerva, a nuclear rocket engine - bore the brunt of the cutbacks. Funding for space programs to follow Apollo appeared in the Johnson administration's 1968 budget. Congress sharply reduced Nerva and Apollo Applications (Skylab) appropriations, cutting the latter from $454.7 million to $253 million. Voyager was eliminated entirely, while Apollo funds fell by less than 2%. For FY 1969 the Johnson administration budgeted $439.6 million for Apollo Applications, $38 million for 1971 and 1973 unmanned missions to Mars, and $41 million for Nerva. Again all three programs were cut sharply: Skylab eventually received $150 million that year. Apollo received all but $14 million of its $2.039 billion request. After the first lunar landing, however, Apollo lost its immunity to cutbacks, and further tight budgets brought reductions there as well. (Source)

The Apollo flight schedule that was published on the eve of the first lunar landing called for nine additional flights before June 1971-a launch every 11 weeks. Apollo 12-15 would develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment; 16-20 would extend the astronauts' stay time on the moon to three days and increase their range of exploration. A primary purpose of the latter missions was to study the technological requirements for a potential lunar base. (Source)

American lunar scientists opposed the rapid pace of the launches. They wanted 6-12 months between flights to study moon samples and plan future experiments. Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Presidential Science Advisor, expressed the scientists' viewpoint in congressional testimony on the FY 1970 NASA budget: "Nothing can do more harm to support for the space program than to have a series of missions for which there are no clear objectives - such as a series of manned revisits to the moon without providing the capability to perform new scientific experiments and to exploit interesting new lunar features." (Source) Three weeks after the first lunar landing, John Noble Wilford, space correspondent for the New York Times, publicized the dispute over Apollo's future. The scientific community, according to Wilford, sought a larger role in mission planning and more scientist astronauts, as well as more time between missions. (Source)

The July 1969 schedule had included an alternate plan that extended the nine remaining launches by 18 months and provided a launch interval of 4-5 months. Following the success of Apollo 11, NASA officials approved the compromise schedule. In defending the choice, George Mueller acknowledged the scientific arguments but cited other major factors. Among these, Mueller included "operational considerations in keeping a steady workload through the Cape" thereby "minimizing the cost." (Source)

While NASA debated the pace of the remaining Apollo missions, a Space Task Group examined the future of America's space program. What lay beyond Apollo was the subject of their September 1969 report, "America's Next Decades in Space." The report's sponsors, a panel including Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, recommended a balanced manned and unmanned space capability. The group listed three possible NASA programs leading to a manned landing on Mars before the end of the century. The most ambitious plan called for a lunar orbiting station by 1978, a lunar surface base and a 50-man, earthorbiting station in 1980, and the first Mars mission in 1983. The cost of all this would reach an annual $8 billion by 1976. The least ambitious plan postponed the lunar base and earth-orbiting station by three years and left open the date for the initial Mars expedition. The funding estimates for this second plan ran slightly more than $4 billion a year during the 1970s. Apollo missions would lay the groundwork for the lunar surface base. The report generated little support, and NASA's budget slipped to $3.3 billion the following year. (Source)

The decline in Apollo funding was even more severe; a reduction of nearly 50% dropped the program's budget below the $1 billion mark for the first time in eight years. While much of the decline represented an expected slowdown in costs, the shortage of funds forced drastic program changes. Edward Mathews, KSC's Apollo Program Manager, notified Debus in March 1970 that FY 1971 funding constraints had eliminated the Apollo 20 mission. There would be an average interval of six months between launches, with Apollo 18-19 put off until 1974 after a year of Skylab missions. Further budget cuts in September included a $50 million reduction for Apollo. NASA officials reluctantly cancelled missions 18 and 19. The flight of Apollo 17 in late 1972 would bring the programme to a close. (Source)

NASA budgets translated into people at KSC. Center employment peaked at 26,000 during Apollo 7 operations in 1968, the same year that KSC's budget reached a high of $490 million. America's space program provided over 40% of Brevard County's employment. By the following spring, KSC faced sharp reductions in both money and manpower. Debus let community leaders know what was coming at a 30 April 1969 briefing. A revised FY 1970 budget, prompted by the Nixon administration's concern over inflation, lowered KSC's appropriation from $455 million to $410 million. The entire reduction came out of the $345 million earmarked for Apollo and reflected the intent to slow the program from five to three launches per year. In terms of manpower, the lower budget would reduce KSC's work force from 23,500 to 18,500 by 30 June 1970. A five-day work week would replace the six- and seven-day weeks that had been typical. Instead of three-shift operations, KSC would employ two, with only enough people on the second to continue necessary tests. Debus took an optimistic view of the cutbacks. The 20% reduction in force affected both stage and support contractors and could probably be met in large part through attrition. Contractor turnover rates at KSC in this period varied from an average of 14% annually for stage contractors to as high as 25% for some support contractors. He thought that "others will see the first lunar landing as a logical milestone in their career plans and move into other programs elsewhere." It would be "a difficult but orderly retrenchment." (Source)

The reduction took a greater toll than Debus had predicted. By mid-1970 KSC's work force had fallen to 16,235. The numbers engaged in Apollo launch operations showed an even steeper decline, 50% from the 17,000 high of 1968. KSC civil service employment dropped less sharply in FY 1970, from 2,920 to 2,880. One reason NASA had contracted a large amount of Apollo work had been to avoid an excess of civil service personnel at the end of the program. Subsequently civil service enrollment at KSC was forced down to 2,425 by the end of the program. Newspapers captioned the plight of Brevard County: "Cocoa Beach Boom Reaches Perigee"; "Most of Brevard in Gloomy Mood"; "Depressed Brevard Banks on Space Shuttle." Reporters described long lines at the employment office and a buyer's market of empty homes and stores. The articles were exaggerated; unemployment never exceeded 6.5%. Realtors and the Chamber of Commerce launched an aggressive campaign in metropolitan newspapers, describing Brevard homes as the best buys in Florida. Within two years an influx of retirees brought stability to the housing market. In similar fashion small businesses were encouraged to locate in the Cape area. Many members of the Apollo team had found jobs in other parts of the country as stage and support contractors made a strong effort to relocate their personnel. (Source)

Although KSC retrenched in orderly fashion, the atmosphere at the center showed a marked change. The pace slowed considerably as the time between launches stretched to eight months. Morale was jeopardized by the space program's uncertain future. As Alan Shepard, Apollo 14 commander, put it: "We kind of feel like the Wright brothers would have felt if they had been told there's not enough money for a second plane because there's no need for airplanes." (Source) During Apollo's last three years, the launch team's esprit was of concern to center and contractor officials alike. The presence of the astronauts remained a positive factor. Launch Director Walter J. Kapryan made them as visible as possible, encouraging their visits with workers at the assembly building and on the pad. Efforts were made to keep everyone busy. That morale never became a significant problem is a tribute to effective civil servant and contractor leadership and to the personal pride of the launch team members. (Source)

Scientific investigations highlighted the last three Apollo missions. The cold war competition that had put men on the moon was fading. Congress and the American public now wanted tangible benefits from space expenditures. NASA adjusted its manned programs to the new climate. Skylab, the post-Apollo manned program, would focus on practical applications, most of them earth-oriented. Apollo, reduced by funding cuts to three more missions, would emphasize lunar exploration. Missions 15-17 did not disappoint American scientists; indeed those missions proved a fitting climax to one of the nation's great achievements.

Discussing the lunar surface ultraviolet camera during an experiments review in the operations and checkout building, November 1971. From left, lunar module pilot Charles Duke; Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director; George Carruthers, Naval Research Laboratory, the principal investigator for the camera; and Apollo 16 commander John Young.

NASA's plans for the concluding Apollo missions were announced on 2 September 1970. Modifications to the spacecraft and astronaut support systems would double the time the astronauts could stay on the moon. The weight devoted to lunar surface experiments would also double. A lunar rover vehicle - an appropriate gift to the moon from an America-on-wheels-would more than double the distance the astronauts could travel on the surface. Other new equipment included a lunar communications relay unit, which enabled the crew to maintain contact with earth while exploring beyond the lunar module's horizon. Transmissions from the portable relay station to Houston included voice, TV, and telemetry. Although the suitcase-sized device was normally mounted on the front of the rover, it could be detached and carried by an astronaut - a feature that ensured the crewmen a means of communication if they had to walk back to their spacecraft. The rover also mounted television cameras that were operated by remote control from Houston. (Source)

The command-service module's lunar orbiting experiments, while less dramatic, were a vital part of the last missions. The scientific instrument module (SIM) in Apollo 15's service module included three spectrometers - gamma-ray, x-ray fluorescence, and alpha-particle - to measure the composition and distribution of the lunar surface. A mass spectrometer would measure the composition and distribution of the lunar atmosphere. A subsatellite, ejected from the SIM bay into lunar orbit, would beam earthward information about solar winds, lunar gravity, and the earth's magnetosphere and its interaction with the moon. Other equipment in the SIM, two cameras and a laser altimeter, would map about 8% of the lunar surface, in all some three million square kilometres. (Source)

The extended missions on the moon required major modifications to the lunar module. Supplies of water, oxygen for the portable life support system, and electrical power were increased. Grumman enlarged the capacity of the propellant tanks by 7% and redesigned the descent stage to make room for the lunar rover. Altogether, the lunar module modifications and the SIM additions added about 2,270 kilograms to the Apollo 15 spacecraft, bringing its total weight to over 48 metric tons. (Source) This put a burden on Saturn engineers. Marshall and its contractors met the payload increase through minor hardware changes in the S-IC stage and by revising the Saturn V's flight plan. The hardware modifications reduced the number of retrorocket motors, rebored the orifices on the F-1 engines, and set the burning time for the outboard engines nearer LOX depletion. Better use of the Saturn's thrust was achieved by launching the AS-510 rocket in a more southerly direction (changing the launch azimuth limits from 72-96 degrees to 80-100 degrees) and by using an earth parking-orbit of 166 rather than 185 kilometres. Apollo 15 also stood to gain some advantage from the July launch date, when temperature and wind effects would be favourable. (Source)


	www.moonlandings.co.uk \| home Apollo 1 \| Apollo 7 \| Apollo 8 \| Apollo 9 \| Apollo 10 \| Apollo 11 \| Apollo 12 \| Apollo 13 \| Apollo 14 \| Apollo 15 \| Apollo 16 \| Apollo 17 \| Apollo 18 - Soyuz \| Saturn V \| Launch Complexes \| Apollo Mission Summaries \| Apollo Facts \| Luna \| Costs Costs Effects of the Apollo 204 Accident on Schedule and Cost of the Apollo Programme The costs of the Apollo missions, and space exploration in general, were more than just financial. Monetary values can never be put on the lives of individuals lost. The Apollo 1 accident and its follow-up investigation resulted in substantial changes in the programme with resultant impacts on cost and schedules. The principal schedule changes and the cost impact of the accident on the programme follow. Apollo Schedule The initial Apollo manned flight with the modified Block II spacecraft is scheduled for launch by an uprated Saturn I vehicle during the third or fourth quarter of calendar 1968, some 17 or 18 months after the scheduled launch of Apollo 204 in February 1967. The first unmanned qualification flight of the Saturn V launch vehicle carrying a Block I spacecraft was rescheduled from early 1967 to late 1967 when a highly successful system performance was realized. This flight is to be followed by a third Saturn V unmanned flight in 1968. If the Saturn V launch vehicle is manrated as a result of these flights and the first manned Block II spacecraft mission meets its objectives, subsequent Apollo flights involving command module and lunar module operations in earth orbit in preparation for the lunar landing would be transferred to the Saturn V vehicle rather than utilizing dual uprated Saturn I launches for these practice missions as previously contemplated. However, dual uprated Saturn I missions could be flown as backup missions in the event of Saturn V vehicle qualification delays. A Saturn V vehicle success schedule now projects six manned launches in 1968 and 1969 with the possibility of accomplishing a lunar landing before 1970. The impact of the Apollo 204 accident has been to reduce the probability of such a landing, not eliminate it. If required for the lunar landing objective, the last six of the original complement of 15 Saturn V vehicles would be launched after 1969. Apollo Programme Cost Time is a major factor influencing the cost of the Apollo programme. In 1966 NASA advised the committee that the total estimated cost of the Apollo program was $22.718 billion assuming that all 12 uprated Saturn I and 15 Saturn V launch vehicles were required for the lunar landing. The comparable estimate provided by NASA during the May 9, 1967 hearing is $23.190 billion, an increase of $472 million. The increase is largely due to the effect of stretching out the Apollo/Saturn V launch schedule. However, early achievement of the lunar landing objective would permit the allocation of unused Apollo hardware and an appropriate share of operational expenses to the Apollo applications program with an offsetting reduction in the cost of the Apollo program. There was no immediate impact of the accident on the NASA fiscal year 1967 financial plan or the fiscal year 1968 budget request because of offsetting factors such as the suspension of flight schedules and changes in spacecraft production planning, which permitted adjustments within the total NASA budget framework for these years. The overall impact of the Apollo 204 accident, therefore, will appear in future years as is evidenced by the increase in the total runout cost estimate for the Apollo program (Source:NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Office, NASA. Headquarters, Washington, DC) Pruning the Apollo Program While 1969-71 were the harvest years - four missions that put men on the moon, and the safe return of Apollo 13 after its breakdown in space - they were not so kind to Kennedy Space Center and the men who worked there. Congress cut the NASA budget, NASA cancelled Apollo missions, KSC and its contractors laid off thousands of employees - not in one fell swoop but in a succession of smaller blows. Space enthusiasts had hoped to go on to a manned landing on Mars in the mid-1980s; it was not to be. American public opinion was shifting its priorities to other matters: civil disorders, Vietnam, decaying cities, campus unrest, and inflation. And Apollo was a victim of its own success. For laymen, one moon landing after another was a little boring. Noting the public's limited interest in Apollo 12, the New York Times concluded that a collective sense of anticlimax was "perhaps predictable considering the intense national emotion spent on the first moon landing four months ago." (Source) Probably the biggest reason for Apollo's decline was the detente in American-Soviet relations. In 1961, amid cold war animosities, the United States was trailing the Soviet Union in the world's most widely publicized form of competition, manned spaceflight. Eight years later, the United States had clearly demonstrated its superiority. Despite the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, relations between the two nations had improved. Americans seemed less eager to spend "whatever it took" to surpass the Russians in space. Agreement on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. rendezvous mission (the Apollo-Soyuz flight of 1975), signed before the end of the Apollo program, clearly indicated a new policy of cooperation in space. NASA budgets marked the contour intervals of Apollo's descent. Appropriations had exceeded $5 billion in the mid-1960s; in fiscal years 1969 and 1970 they fell below $4 billion. Apollo research and development funding declined from $2.9 billion in FY 1967 to $2 billion in FY 1969. Initially, NASA's follow-on programs to Apollo-Skylab, an earth orbital laboratory; Voyager, an unmanned Mars mission; and Nerva, a nuclear rocket engine - bore the brunt of the cutbacks. Funding for space programs to follow Apollo appeared in the Johnson administration's 1968 budget. Congress sharply reduced Nerva and Apollo Applications (Skylab) appropriations, cutting the latter from $454.7 million to $253 million. Voyager was eliminated entirely, while Apollo funds fell by less than 2%. For FY 1969 the Johnson administration budgeted $439.6 million for Apollo Applications, $38 million for 1971 and 1973 unmanned missions to Mars, and $41 million for Nerva. Again all three programs were cut sharply: Skylab eventually received $150 million that year. Apollo received all but $14 million of its $2.039 billion request. After the first lunar landing, however, Apollo lost its immunity to cutbacks, and further tight budgets brought reductions there as well. (Source) The Apollo flight schedule that was published on the eve of the first lunar landing called for nine additional flights before June 1971-a launch every 11 weeks. Apollo 12-15 would develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment; 16-20 would extend the astronauts' stay time on the moon to three days and increase their range of exploration. A primary purpose of the latter missions was to study the technological requirements for a potential lunar base. (Source) American lunar scientists opposed the rapid pace of the launches. They wanted 6-12 months between flights to study moon samples and plan future experiments. Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Presidential Science Advisor, expressed the scientists' viewpoint in congressional testimony on the FY 1970 NASA budget: "Nothing can do more harm to support for the space program than to have a series of missions for which there are no clear objectives - such as a series of manned revisits to the moon without providing the capability to perform new scientific experiments and to exploit interesting new lunar features." (Source) Three weeks after the first lunar landing, John Noble Wilford, space correspondent for the New York Times, publicized the dispute over Apollo's future. The scientific community, according to Wilford, sought a larger role in mission planning and more scientist astronauts, as well as more time between missions. (Source) The July 1969 schedule had included an alternate plan that extended the nine remaining launches by 18 months and provided a launch interval of 4-5 months. Following the success of Apollo 11, NASA officials approved the compromise schedule. In defending the choice, George Mueller acknowledged the scientific arguments but cited other major factors. Among these, Mueller included "operational considerations in keeping a steady workload through the Cape" thereby "minimizing the cost." (Source) While NASA debated the pace of the remaining Apollo missions, a Space Task Group examined the future of America's space program. What lay beyond Apollo was the subject of their September 1969 report, "America's Next Decades in Space." The report's sponsors, a panel including Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, recommended a balanced manned and unmanned space capability. The group listed three possible NASA programs leading to a manned landing on Mars before the end of the century. The most ambitious plan called for a lunar orbiting station by 1978, a lunar surface base and a 50-man, earthorbiting station in 1980, and the first Mars mission in 1983. The cost of all this would reach an annual $8 billion by 1976. The least ambitious plan postponed the lunar base and earth-orbiting station by three years and left open the date for the initial Mars expedition. The funding estimates for this second plan ran slightly more than $4 billion a year during the 1970s. Apollo missions would lay the groundwork for the lunar surface base. The report generated little support, and NASA's budget slipped to $3.3 billion the following year. (Source) The decline in Apollo funding was even more severe; a reduction of nearly 50% dropped the program's budget below the $1 billion mark for the first time in eight years. While much of the decline represented an expected slowdown in costs, the shortage of funds forced drastic program changes. Edward Mathews, KSC's Apollo Program Manager, notified Debus in March 1970 that FY 1971 funding constraints had eliminated the Apollo 20 mission. There would be an average interval of six months between launches, with Apollo 18-19 put off until 1974 after a year of Skylab missions. Further budget cuts in September included a $50 million reduction for Apollo. NASA officials reluctantly cancelled missions 18 and 19. The flight of Apollo 17 in late 1972 would bring the programme to a close. (Source) The Impact of the Apollo Slowdown on KSC NASA budgets translated into people at KSC. Center employment peaked at 26,000 during Apollo 7 operations in 1968, the same year that KSC's budget reached a high of $490 million. America's space program provided over 40% of Brevard County's employment. By the following spring, KSC faced sharp reductions in both money and manpower. Debus let community leaders know what was coming at a 30 April 1969 briefing. A revised FY 1970 budget, prompted by the Nixon administration's concern over inflation, lowered KSC's appropriation from $455 million to $410 million. The entire reduction came out of the $345 million earmarked for Apollo and reflected the intent to slow the program from five to three launches per year. In terms of manpower, the lower budget would reduce KSC's work force from 23,500 to 18,500 by 30 June 1970. A five-day work week would replace the six- and seven-day weeks that had been typical. Instead of three-shift operations, KSC would employ two, with only enough people on the second to continue necessary tests. Debus took an optimistic view of the cutbacks. The 20% reduction in force affected both stage and support contractors and could probably be met in large part through attrition. Contractor turnover rates at KSC in this period varied from an average of 14% annually for stage contractors to as high as 25% for some support contractors. He thought that "others will see the first lunar landing as a logical milestone in their career plans and move into other programs elsewhere." It would be "a difficult but orderly retrenchment." (Source) The reduction took a greater toll than Debus had predicted. By mid-1970 KSC's work force had fallen to 16,235. The numbers engaged in Apollo launch operations showed an even steeper decline, 50% from the 17,000 high of 1968. KSC civil service employment dropped less sharply in FY 1970, from 2,920 to 2,880. One reason NASA had contracted a large amount of Apollo work had been to avoid an excess of civil service personnel at the end of the program. Subsequently civil service enrollment at KSC was forced down to 2,425 by the end of the program. Newspapers captioned the plight of Brevard County: "Cocoa Beach Boom Reaches Perigee"; "Most of Brevard in Gloomy Mood"; "Depressed Brevard Banks on Space Shuttle." Reporters described long lines at the employment office and a buyer's market of empty homes and stores. The articles were exaggerated; unemployment never exceeded 6.5%. Realtors and the Chamber of Commerce launched an aggressive campaign in metropolitan newspapers, describing Brevard homes as the best buys in Florida. Within two years an influx of retirees brought stability to the housing market. In similar fashion small businesses were encouraged to locate in the Cape area. Many members of the Apollo team had found jobs in other parts of the country as stage and support contractors made a strong effort to relocate their personnel. (Source) Although KSC retrenched in orderly fashion, the atmosphere at the center showed a marked change. The pace slowed considerably as the time between launches stretched to eight months. Morale was jeopardized by the space program's uncertain future. As Alan Shepard, Apollo 14 commander, put it: "We kind of feel like the Wright brothers would have felt if they had been told there's not enough money for a second plane because there's no need for airplanes." (Source) During Apollo's last three years, the launch team's esprit was of concern to center and contractor officials alike. The presence of the astronauts remained a positive factor. Launch Director Walter J. Kapryan made them as visible as possible, encouraging their visits with workers at the assembly building and on the pad. Efforts were made to keep everyone busy. That morale never became a significant problem is a tribute to effective civil servant and contractor leadership and to the personal pride of the launch team members. (Source) Extended Lunar Exploration: Apollo 15-17 A Change of Course for Apollo Scientific investigations highlighted the last three Apollo missions. The cold war competition that had put men on the moon was fading. Congress and the American public now wanted tangible benefits from space expenditures. NASA adjusted its manned programs to the new climate. Skylab, the post-Apollo manned program, would focus on practical applications, most of them earth-oriented. Apollo, reduced by funding cuts to three more missions, would emphasize lunar exploration. Missions 15-17 did not disappoint American scientists; indeed those missions proved a fitting climax to one of the nation's great achievements. Discussing the lunar surface ultraviolet camera during an experiments review in the operations and checkout building, November 1971. From left, lunar module pilot Charles Duke; Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director; George Carruthers, Naval Research Laboratory, the principal investigator for the camera; and Apollo 16 commander John Young. NASA's plans for the concluding Apollo missions were announced on 2 September 1970. Modifications to the spacecraft and astronaut support systems would double the time the astronauts could stay on the moon. The weight devoted to lunar surface experiments would also double. A lunar rover vehicle - an appropriate gift to the moon from an America-on-wheels-would more than double the distance the astronauts could travel on the surface. Other new equipment included a lunar communications relay unit, which enabled the crew to maintain contact with earth while exploring beyond the lunar module's horizon. Transmissions from the portable relay station to Houston included voice, TV, and telemetry. Although the suitcase-sized device was normally mounted on the front of the rover, it could be detached and carried by an astronaut - a feature that ensured the crewmen a means of communication if they had to walk back to their spacecraft. The rover also mounted television cameras that were operated by remote control from Houston. (Source) The command-service module's lunar orbiting experiments, while less dramatic, were a vital part of the last missions. The scientific instrument module (SIM) in Apollo 15's service module included three spectrometers - gamma-ray, x-ray fluorescence, and alpha-particle - to measure the composition and distribution of the lunar surface. A mass spectrometer would measure the composition and distribution of the lunar atmosphere. A subsatellite, ejected from the SIM bay into lunar orbit, would beam earthward information about solar winds, lunar gravity, and the earth's magnetosphere and its interaction with the moon. Other equipment in the SIM, two cameras and a laser altimeter, would map about 8% of the lunar surface, in all some three million square kilometres. (Source) The extended missions on the moon required major modifications to the lunar module. Supplies of water, oxygen for the portable life support system, and electrical power were increased. Grumman enlarged the capacity of the propellant tanks by 7% and redesigned the descent stage to make room for the lunar rover. Altogether, the lunar module modifications and the SIM additions added about 2,270 kilograms to the Apollo 15 spacecraft, bringing its total weight to over 48 metric tons. (Source) This put a burden on Saturn engineers. Marshall and its contractors met the payload increase through minor hardware changes in the S-IC stage and by revising the Saturn V's flight plan. The hardware modifications reduced the number of retrorocket motors, rebored the orifices on the F-1 engines, and set the burning time for the outboard engines nearer LOX depletion. Better use of the Saturn's thrust was achieved by launching the AS-510 rocket in a more southerly direction (changing the launch azimuth limits from 72-96 degrees to 80-100 degrees) and by using an earth parking-orbit of 166 rather than 185 kilometres. Apollo 15 also stood to gain some advantage from the July launch date, when temperature and wind effects would be favourable. (Source) Discussing the lunar surface ultraviolet camera during an experiments review in the operations and checkout building, November 1971. From left, lunar module pilot Charles Duke; Rocco Petrone, Apollo Program Director; George Carruthers, Naval Research Laboratory, the principal investigator for the camera; and Apollo 16 commander John Young More details of the monetary costs of the so-called 'Moon Race' may be found here Apollo Programme Contents